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Today, the expected economic and social 
consequences of the coronavirus epidemic 
are in the center of the attention of both the 
professional community and society. The 
public has every right to expect specialists and 
researchers to answer their questions arising 
based on their concerns and fears. The objective 
of my study is to attempt to forecast the public 
debts of Eu member states occurring due to 
the coronavirus epidemic in the medium term 
by using data and information originating 
from reliable sources (IMF, EcB, EP, etc.) and 
by applying an econometric model accepted 
and widely used in today’s economics. It is, as 
a matter of fact, obvious for all of us that the 
performance of the economy falls back due 
to the coronavirus epidemic, and at the same 
time, the revenues of the entire government 
sector are decreasing, in parallel to the 
drastic increase of their expenditures. These 
two jointly result in the dynamic rise of the 
indebtedness of states.E-mail address:  dr.torok.laszlo@eng.unideb.hu
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Economic expectations have been changing 
almost continuously in the past few months, 
no one has an accurate view of the potential 
economic impacts of the coronavirus. 
Previously, an economic growth rate of 
1.4% was estimated for the entirety of the 
European union for 2020 (Ec, 2020). It is 
abundantly clear that a rise of this rate will be 
completely unattainable due to the impacts of 
the coronavirus epidemic already known, and 
it is also quite trivial that the public debt rates 
will increase in the countries of the European 
union. At the same time, this also means that 
there will be a break in the downward trend 
in government debt rates lasting since 2014 in 
the Eu. In the period between 2014 and 2019, 
the European union gross consolidated public 
debt to GDP ratio dropped from 92.8% to 
84.1% in 19 member states of the Monetary 
union, while it fell from 87% to 79.3% in the 
case of 28 member states (Eurostat, 2020). See 
Figure 1.
several years of public debt shrinkage will 
go to waste due to the outbreak and global 
escalation of the epidemic, and not only in the 
countries of the European union. This can be 
stated safely because economic growth is, in 
addition to several other factors, one of the 
significant elements influencing public debt. I 
will present these factors in detail later on in 
my study.
PUblIc dEbt and tHE dIFFErEnt 
PErcEPtIonS oF ItS ExtEnt
The gross consolidated public debt equals 
the total deficit of the government sector 
accumulated in the past. We accept and apply 
this statement while bearing in mind that 
Figure 1
The ToTal gross public debT of eu member sTaTes in gdp percenTage  
(2010-2019)
Source: Eurostat (2020), edited by the author
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there have been and will be items that have 
not/are not included in the deficit. If the total 
expenditures of the government sector exceed 
the revenues thereof in a given year, the state 
may issue debt instruments (typically zero-
coupon treasury bonds and state bonds) to 
finance the deficit generated this way, or may 
resort to taking out a loan. The volume of 
debt instruments issued to finance the deficit 
accrued over the years forms the government 
debt. The state is bound to pay interest for 
its existing debt. Even though the balance of 
a state calculated without interest payments 
(primary balance) may be in equilibrium in an 
indebted country, a deficit may already occur 
due to the interest payments. The mutually 
reinforcing process of the rise in debt and 
debt service (interest payment) implemented 
through positive feedback requires the 
achievement of a surplus on the level of 
the primary balance so that the debt does 
not increase. This statement pertains to the 
nominal values, of course, however it depicts 
the nature of the indebtedness process well 
(Török, 2012).
Financing the general government deficit 
can be ensured in two ways according to 
the classic formula: via bond financing and 
capital financing. In the countries of the 
European union, financing through the 
creation of money is not a viable solution, 
as the central bank cannot provide a loan to 
the state according to the act on the central 
bank. If financing via the creation of money 
is not an option for any reason, then the 
nominal increase in public debt occurring 
in a given period will equal the general 
government deficit by default. Another 
element influencing government debt is the 
increase or decrease of the public debt ratio 
denominated in foreign currency due to the 
change of exchange rates.
As opposed to the aforementioned, the 
debt can also be regarded as the value of the 
state’s future liabilities discounted to the 
present. This approach is primarily important 
as it shows the room for maneuver economic 
policy will have in the future. Many times, the 
state has commitments that are not included 
in the official deficit figures, however, they 
pose liabilities that will certainly arise in the 
future. However, our study does not examine 
these so-called implicit future liabilities. For 
details see (Mosolygó, 2010).
In economics, there is no specific rule 
for the optimal extent of the debt rate of a 
given national economy. The 60% debt-to-
GDP outlined in the Maastricht Treaty is a 
product of a conventional agreement, serving 
as a sort of the point of reference. The only 
requirement about the extent of the public 
debt is that it should approach the level given 
as GDP percentage at a 'satisfactory rate' 
(Benczes, Kutasi, 2010). several studies strived 
to determine the limit of government debt rate 
above which the debt has a negative impact 
on the economic growth of the given national 
economy. Examining this, (Reinhart, Rogoff, 
2010) concluded that public debt above 90% 
of the GDP consistently decreases the growth 
of the given national economy. In opposition, 
Herndon et al. (2014) found that there is no 
significant difference between the average and 
median GDP growth of countries with public 
debt below or above the 90% threshold. 
They concluded that public debt and growth 
of GDP varied significantly by country and 
period.
An important conclusion of debt dynamics 
models is that the debt (or at least a part of 
it) can also be grown out. If the correction is 
made in a growth-friendly environment, with 
structural measures also sustainable in the 
longer-term, this also improves the budget 
balance directly on the one hand and will result 
in public debt representing an increasingly 
lower share compared to the GDP through the 
denominator impact (Hoffmann, 2011).
 Focus: covid – shock – Therapy 
Public Finance Quarterly  2020/3 351
It was an important revelation of 
researching the global public debt rise due to 
the subprime crisis that monetary policy is not 
sufficient on its own, and there is also a need 
for the active use of fiscal policy in the course 
of crisis management (Blanchard et al., 2010). 
Arestis (2014) drew a similar conclusion in 
his paper, pointing out that the national 
economic policies are further strengthened by 
the adequate coordination of monetary and 
fiscal policy to create financial stability. As 
shown by the later parts of the study, fiscal and 
monetary cooperation will have a central role 
in financing the growing public debt due to 
the coronavirus epidemic.
tHE tHEorEtIcal MEtHodoloGy  
oF tHE ForEcaSt
Analyses and forecasts pertaining to the status, 
expected change, and public debt of a given 
national economy have been a frequent subject 
of macroeconomic studies. Their examination 
was particularly amplified following the 
subprime crisis in 2008, as several national 
economies reached the financing limit of their 
government debts. The financing limit meant 
that several countries were unable to manage 
their public debt from the financial markets 
(Török, 2012). out of these countries, Greece 
maintained its solvency related to its public 
debt by resorting to the so-called orderly 
default.1
Public debt will increase significantly on a 
global scale due to the coronavirus epidemic. 
This is triggered by the collective impact of 
several factors. General government spending 
will increase, while tax revenues will fall behind 
due to the economic downturn. The new loans 
and guarantees offered to businesses as well 
as financing and compensating the income 
support of households will also increase the 
indebtedness of national economies.2
In the period of the coronavirus epidemic, 
the forecast of the public debt of national 
economies is in the center of increased 
attention, as the expected debt rates calculated 
with substantiated prognoses are decisive, 
and serve as a sort of compass for developing 
strategies of financial policy.
Due to the coronavirus epidemic, when 
forecasting the expected rise in government 
debt in Eu member states, I start from 
a model suitable for presenting the most 
important links of debt dynamics. Then I 
expand the model through the gradual and 
substantiated modification of the initial 
condition to make it as suitable as possible for 
quantifying the future public debt positions 
of Eu member states. The model is based on 
the division of the change of the debt rate and 
shows the impacts and dynamics of the factors 
influencing the public debt with the help 
of the links between the three explanatory 
variables. so that the expected future output 
values of the public debt rates of Eu member 
states can be forecasted, a macroeconomic 
framework was needed on which we can 
rely when forecasting, and allowing us to 
conduct scenario analyses. When selecting 
and applying the macroeconomic forecast 
model, two factors should prevail: the model 
should be adjusted well to the input data and 
thus it should have an appropriate forecasting 
capability; and the theoretical relationships 
should also be echoed in its structure. The 
model to be applied will satisfy the criteria 
set out in the previous paragraph. Given all 
the above considerations, the econometric 
fundamentals of the simulation are provided 
by the following equation:
bt = [(1 + rt–1)/(1+gt–1)] bt–1– pbt (1)
In this equation, b and pb mark the public 
debt to GDP and the primary balance of the 
budget respectively, r stands for real interest, 
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and g represents economic growth (Balatoni, 
Tóth, 2011).3 It follows from the equation 
that the change of the debt rate fundamentally 
depends on the relationship between the real 
interest and real growth as well as the primary 
balance of public finances.
dEFInInG tHE InPUt varIablES  
oF tHE ModEl
1  The rate of economic growth: the change 
of GDP compared to last year’s figures. This 
must be considered in the calculation as it is 
not the absolute extent of the debt, but its 
ratio to GDP that has a macroeconomic 
relevance. The decrease in debt rate resulting 
from growth is marked by this variable (GDP-
growth impact). If the economy grows, and 
presuming an unchanged budgetary policy, 
the general government revenues will 
automatically increase, resulting in more 
financial resources available for reducing the 
public debt. The decrease in the GDP results 
in a reversed impact.
2  The primary balance of the budget 
(public finances) calculated without 
interest payments: realizing a smaller primary 
deficit (more surplus) helps to reduce the 
existing debt. This variable is fundamentally 
influenced either negatively or positively by 
the balance-improving or deteriorating 
measures imposed by the government, as the 
interest revenue accounted for among debt 
service revenues and the interest payments 
related to debt service do not form part of the 
primary balance. If the primary balance is 
positive, then the revenues of the given year 
cover expenditures and the budget deficit are 
only resulting from the interest burden of 
previously accumulated debts. This variable 
shows the debt-increasing impact of the 
budget deficit to GDP (primary deficit impact) 
if the deficit increases. If there is a surplus in 
the state budget, it may/will reduce the public 
debt depending on economic policy priorities 
as may be changed from time to time.
3  Real interest rate (nominal interest 
rate/expected inflation rate, see footnote no. 3): 
due to the high amounts and relatively slow 
repricing of public debt, the potential decrease 
in real interests can only have a positive impact 
on the mitigation of the debt rate gradually. 
Financing public debt requires loans. In the 
costs of the loans (i.e. the interest), the risks of 
the given loan are quantified. If financing the 
public debt of a given national economy is of 
high risk due to the economic fundamentals, 
such circumstances will manifest in higher 
interest rates expected by creditors. However, 
the high real interest rate will result in higher 
costs of financing the public debt. If the real 
interest exceeds the extent of real growth, a 
surplus will be needed on the level of the 
primary balance for an unchanged debt rate, 
while with a real interest falling short of the 
real growth rate, the stability of the debt rate 
can be ensured even in the case of a deficit in 
the primary balance. In the case of the interest 
expenditures of the state, the actual burden is 
posed by the real interest in excess of the 
inflation compensation.4
tHE FraMEwork oF tHE InPUt 
varIablES oF tHE ModEl
Today we can only estimate the course of the 
post-coVID-19 recovery within relatively 
broad boundaries, therefore I opted for 
analyzing the future development of the 
expected public debt rate of every Eu member 
state individually with four recovery scenarios 
of different courses known and applied today. 
The first wave of the coronavirus epidemic 
could be significantly prolonged. Probably 
there will also be additional waves (MTA, 
2020). In light of all this, the macroeconomic 
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model will contain rather pessimistic than 
optimistic input variables.
I have set up a total of five different 
scenarios depending on the time course of the 
coronavirus epidemic.
In the case of the V course, it is probable 
that the initial dramatic economic downturn 
will be followed by a bounce-back of a similar 
dynamic, the recession will end at latest at the 
end of this year, and the national economies 
of the European union will return to their 
operation planned pre-crisis from 2021 after 
suffering the one-time shock.
In the case of a W course, the one-time 
significant economic downturn is followed by 
a sudden bounce back, which will be repeated 
in this year at least one more time. In total, the 
result of this scenario could be more drastic 
compared to the first one. summarily, the V 
and W course forecast stronger temporary 
global economic impacts of the coronavirus 
pandemic in the member states of the 
European union.
In the case of an u/1 course, the one-
time shock-like economic downturn in 2020 
will remain low all through the year.
In the case of the u/2 course, the 
downturn of the previous year will continue 
into and remain low all through 2021.
The u/1 and u/2 scenarios will demonstrate 
the permanent global economic impacts of the 
coronavirus pandemic in Eu member states. 
Finally, the 5th scenario assumes that by 
2022, Eu member states will have overcome 
the recession by suffering the consequences 
of either of scenarios 1-4. Therefore, from 
2022, the national economies of the Eu will 
continue their economic activity with the 
fiscal and monetary parameters planned for 
the year before the outbreak of the epidemic. 
Therefore, the potential public debt rates of 
Eu member states will be calculated for these 
five scenarios with the presented econometric 
model for the years 2020, 2021, and 2022.
tHE InPUt data oF tHE ModEl
The explanatory variables presented in 
the previous chapter and the relationships 
between them forecast that the results of the 
public debt outputs are dependent on the 
input values of the variables. As ultimately the 
expected public debt rate values of the national 
economies of the Eu will be quantified, the 
substantiated selection of their values will be 
relevant.
Forecasting economic downturn: today 
it can be safely stated that there will be a 
significant downturn in economic growth 
as a result of the coronavirus epidemic. 
The extent of the recession hitting certain 
national economies of the Eu is also subject 
to debates between experts. At the time of 
writing the study, for determining the values 
of the economic downturn, I will use the data 
by country published on the website of the 
European Parliament following the outbreak 
of the coronavirus epidemic in Europe in 
part. These data originate from the reports 
of the central bank of the given Eu member 
states but are not comprehensive (EP, 2020). 
The other two basic data sources were the 
forecasts of the World Bank (WB, 2020) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 
2020) about the global economic downturn, 
published following the pandemic.
In the years 2020-2021 of the crisis, the 
values of the GDP downturn in the four 
scenarios will range between -1.1 and -11.3% 
in the national economies of the Eu. I 
incorporated the GDP data forecasted for 
2022 from the (EP, 2019) database. The values 
of these data are positive in the case of almost 
every Eu country, their values range between 
0.8 and 5.0%.
The estimate of the primary balance 
of the budget: similarly to the estimation 
of the economic downturn, forecasting the 
primary balance of public finances of the 
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given Eu member states also carry numerous 
uncertainties. The data source of the ex-ante 
values of budgetary balances was formed 
by the EP, WB, and IMF databases used for 
estimating economic growth. It is a relevant 
circumstance that concerning the economic 
situation caused by the coronavirus epidemic, 
the Eu suspends the strict rules pertaining to 
the budget deficit in order to allow member 
state governments to finance the economy 
more flexibly. In practice, this decision means 
that the Eu allows member states to spend 
on the protection against the epidemic and 
on mitigating the impacts of the coronavirus 
epidemic on the economy. While doing so, 
the Eu foregoes the rules about the budget 
deficit. one of the basic theorems of the latter 
is a deficit to GDP limit below 3%. The input 
data of the model calculation shows that the 
extents of the forecasted deficits range between 
-1.0 and -11.8% in 2020-2021 in the national 
economies of the Eu. I forecast the end of the 
crisis to the beginning of 2022, the figures of 
the balance of the budget specified in the (EB, 
2019) forecast are expected to be realized by 
this time. These values are expected to range 
between –1.3 and 2.4 in the member states of 
the European union.
Expected real interest rates: the 
permanently low inflation environment of 
the global economy experienced in the past 
period and the moderate economic growth 
also suggested a negative real interest rate 
looking ahead until the coronavirus outbreak. 
The applicable interest rates are also low in 
the Eu. According to the flash estimate of 
Eurostat, the annual HIcP inflation of the 
eurozone dropped from 1.4% in January to 
1.2% by February 2020. In the medium term, 
the monetary policy measures of the EcB will 
support inflation therefore they are planned to 
be kept low. There is great uncertainty around 
the impacts of the coronavirus on inflation. 
This is possible because the downward 
pressures related to weaker demand may be 
balanced by the upward pressures related to 
disruptions in supply (EcB 2020).
Despite the uncertainty, a fiscal and 
monetary recovery was started in developed 
national economies, and thus in the European 
union, too, in the course of fighting against 
the coronavirus epidemic. Theoretically, this 
strengthens the persistence of current interest 
rates. It is my view however that financing 
the rising public debts will require the forced 
involvement of vast new resources. As a result, 
it is my perception that the current negative 
real interest rates will cease by the end of 2021 
in the member states of the European union, 
and by5 2022 they are expected to amount to 
zero or be on the positive range in all national 
economies of the Eu except for Luxembourg 
and sweden. I incorporated this tendency into 
the model calculation. However, in 2022, 
the development of positive real interest rates 
mitigate the decrease in public debt starting 
as a result of the significantly improving state 
budget deficit (following the logic of the 
model), in almost all Eu national economies.
In the four crisis scenarios, the real 
interests range between –0.7 and 2.4%, and 
in 2022 considered the year of recovery they 
are expected to be positive in the case of all 
national economies except for two countries. 
In the countries with a non-negative real 
interest rate today, financing the increasing 
public debt will entail significant explicit 
costs, due to the further increase of the real 
interest rates. The increase of the real interest 
rates of national economies in this situation 
will contribute to the increase of the public 
debt rate of these countries greatly, as it will be 
demonstrated by the results received.
There is no data estimate available for 
incorporating the values of the real interest 
rates into the econometry model, therefore I 
incorporated the estimated values of the short-
term interest rates for 2020 (oEcD, 2020a), 
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and those of the long-term interest rates for 
2021 (oEcD, 2020b), while for 2022, I 
forecasted a change with the dynamic that 
can be observed between the 2020 and 2021 
forecasts6. See Table 1.
rESUltS
The data of Table 2 summarise the results of 
the model calculation.
The data of Table 1 demonstrate it well 
that if the recession continues into 2022, 
the decrease in public debt rates will start 
moderately in all Eu member states except 
for Denmark, spain, and Italy. Before that, 
however, in the years of 2020-2021, a 
significant rise in public debt can be expected 
in every member state of the European union. 
The W course of the epidemic (where there 
are two downturns and bounce backs within a 
year) shows similar results to the crisis course 
of u/2 (with a lower crisis compared to the 
one before in the years of 2020 and 2021, but 
it is prolonged in time).
The extent of the public debt growth 
rate calculated for the end of 2021 varies by 
country. By categorizing them into groups, the 
following conclusions can be drawn. There are 
a total of seven national economies where the 
cumulated public debt growth rate of the two 
crisis years is expected to reach 8% or lower. 
In this group, the most moderate public debt 
growth rate can be forecasted in the case of 
Estonia, Luxembourg, and Bulgaria with 
4.1%, 4.5%, and 5.5% values respectively. 
The last one in the group is Germany with 
an 8% value. The scandinavian countries also 
belong to this group except for Finland, and 
a moderate public debt growth rate can be 
expected in their case, too, even compared to 
their low base, however, the rate of Denmark 
and sweden will still only be around 40%.
The group encompassing most countries 
(a total of 13) is the one suffering a public 
debt growth rate between 8 and 16%. This 
category is opened by Lithuania and Latvia 
with their 10.2% public debt growth rate 
figures and is closed by slovenia with a 15.2% 
cumulated public debt growth rate out of the 
13 countries. Within the group, the highest 
gross public debt to GDP can be expected in 
Austria at a value of 85.2%.
Five countries must face a rise of state 
indebtedness rate between 16-24% qualifying 
as extraordinarily high at the end of 2021 
based on the already presented scenarios. This 
group encompasses croatia, France, Belgium, 
Portugal, and spain with their 18.5, 19.1, 
19.2, 22.3, and 23.2% values. In terms of the 
rise in the public debt rate, it is concerning in 
the case of France and spain that the rise will 
hit the second and fourth-largest economies of 
the Eu, and the absolute value of the debt rise 
of the two countries gives more than one-third 
of the entire rise forecasted in the member 
states of the European union. See Figure 2.
out of 27 member states of the European 
union, the forecasted public debt growth 
rates of 29.6% and 37.1% are extremely 
high in the case of Italy and Greece. Growth 
of such extent is not unprecedented in the 
history of the European union.7 In terms of 
Greece, it can be stated that its public debt to 
GDP will exceed 200% in the case of either 
of the scenarios of the coronavirus epidemic 
presented before.8 And this will be a level of 
state indebtedness that is unprecedented in 
the history of the European union. Italy is 
the third-largest economy in the European 
union, therefore funding the forecasted rate 
of public debt increase will require major 
efforts. The absolute value of the gross debt 
rise of the country gives more than 24% of 
the total public debt growth of the European 
community.
The indebtedness figures of the latter 
three countries (spain, Italy, and Greece) are 
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Table 1
The inpuT values of The model as a percenTage of gdp (2020–2022)
country
evolution of gdp (g) real interest (r) budget deficit (pb)
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belgium –6.9 –8.6 –5.5 –4.0 1.2 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 0.0 0.4 –8.9 –11.1 –6.7 –4.4 –0.3
bulgaria –4.0 –4.6 –3.0 –1.9 3.3 –0.6 –0.6 –0.6 0.1 0.8 –3.2 –4.0 –2.6 –1.4 0.1
czech republic –6.5 –8.1 –5.2 –3.2 2.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.1 1.9 –5.0 –6.3 –4.0 –2.3 –0.4
denmark –3.0 –3.8 –2.9 –1.5 1.1 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 0.0 –6.5 –8.1 3.2 –2.0 0.1
Germany –6.7 –8.3 –5.3 –3.3 1.0 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 0.0 –5.5 –6.8 –4.4 –2.4 0.5
Estonia –7.5 –9.3 –5.9 –3.8 1.8 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 0.0 0.4 –8.3 –10.4 –6.6 –3.8 0.4
Ireland –6.8 –8.5 –5.4 –3.5 2.5 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 0.0 0.4 –5.2 –6.5 –4.1 –2.4 0.5
Greece –9.9 –12.3 –7.9 –4.4 2.6 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 1.6 2.0 –9.0 –11.2 –7.2 –4.0 –0.7
Spain –8.0 –9.9 –6.3 –3.6 1.8 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 0.6 1.6 –9.5 –11.8 –7.6 –4.2 –1.3
France –7.2 –9.0 –5.8 –3.2 1.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 0.0 0.4 –9.2 –11.5 –7.3 –4.2 –0.6
croatia –9.0 –11.2 8.1 3.1 2.3 –0.7 –0.7 –0.7 0.0 0.7 –8.0 –9.9 –6.4 –3.5 0.7
Italy –9.1 –11.3 –8.2 –3.1 0.8 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 1.5 1.9 –8.3 –10.3 6.6 –3.7 –1.3
cyprus –6.5 –8.1 –5.9 –2.1 3.0 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 0.0 0.4 –1.8 –2.4 –1.4 –1.0 1.1
latvia –8.6 –10.8 –7.8 –3.0 2.9 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 0.1 0.6 –5.2 –6.5 –4.1 –2.4 –0.2
lithuania –8.1 –10.1 –7.3 –2.8 2.3 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 0.3 1.0 –7.6 –9.5 –6.1 –3.4 0.1
luxembourg –4.9 –6.1 –4.4 –1.7 3.0 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.3 –0.2 –2.8 –3.5 –2.2 –1.3 2.4
Hungary –3.1 –3.9 –2.8 –1.1 4.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 2.2 2.4 –3.5 –4.4 –2.8 –1.6 –0.2
Malta –2.8 –3.5 –2.5 –1.0 5.0 –0.5 –0.5 –0.5 0.0 1.0 –7.2 –9.0 –5.7 –3.3 1.1
netherland –7.5 –9.4 –6.8 –2.6 1.0 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.2 0.0 –6.2 –7.7 –5.0 –2.7 1.5
austria –7.0 –8.7 –6.3 –2.4 1.6 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –1.1 0.2 –7.1 –8.8 –5.6 –3.2 0.1
Poland –3.2 –4.0 –2.9 –1.1 3.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.1 2.0 –8.0 9.9 –6.4 –3.5 –0.6
Portugal –8.0 –9.9 –7.2 –2.7 2.0 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 0.5 1.4 –7.1 –8.8 –5.7 –3.1 0.3
romania –5.9 –7.4 –7.2 –2.8 5.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.9 –6.7 –8.4 –5.4 –3.0 –0.9
Slovenia –8.0 –10.0 –7.2 –2.8 2.7 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 0.0 0.4 –6.6 –8.2 –5.3 –2.9 1.3
Slovakia –6.2 –7.8 –5.7 –2.1 2.5 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 0.1 0.6 –5.9 –7.3 –4.7 –2.6 0.1
Finland –6.0 –8.0 –5.8 –2.2 1.0 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.1 0.2 –6.7 –8.4 –5.4 –3.0 1.2
Sweden –3.9 –4.9 –3.6 –1.3 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.1 –0.2 –3.8 –4.7 –3.0 –1.7 0.9
Source: EP (2020), wb (2020), IMF (2020), EP (2019), Eb (2019), Mnb (2020), tE (2020), edited by the author
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Table 2
The ex-anTe values of The ouTpuTs of The public debT To gdp as a percenTage  
of gdp (2020–2022)
country
2019 2020 2021 2022
change by 
the end of 
the crisis
base 
year
v course
W 
course
u/1 
course
u/2 
course
post-
crisis
(2021–  
2019)
belgium 98.6 114.4 118.5 110.6 117.8 116.1 19.2
bulgaria 20.4 24.3 25.3 23.5 25.9 25.8 5.5
czech republic 30.8 38.0 39.9 36.6 38.1 39.1 7.3
denmark 33.2 40.6 42.5 37.3 39.6 39.7 6.4
Germany 59.8 69.3 71.8 67.3 67.8 66.2 8.0
Estonia 8.4 17.3 19.9 15.5 12.5 12.5 4.1
Ireland 58.8 68.0 70.5 66.0 70.9 68.8 12.1
Greece 176.6 202.5 207.3 196.5 213.7 211.9 37.1
Spain 97.6 115.2 119.7 111.3 120.8 122.3 23.2
France 98.1 114.5 118.9 111.0 117.2 115.6 19.1
croatia 73.2 87.9 91.8 85.5 91.7 89.6 18.5
Italy 134.8 156.0 161.7 154.0 164.4 166.7 29.6
cyprus 95.5 103.5 105.9 102.5 105.7 101.9 10.2
latvia 36.9 45.4 47.7 44.0 47.1 45.8 10.2
lithuania 36.3 46.9 49.7 45.1 48.9 47.4 12.6
luxembourg 22.1 25.9 26.9 25.2 26.6 23.2 4.5
Hungary 66.3 72.1 73.5 71.1 77.1 73.2 10.8
Malta 43.1 51.3 53.4 49.7 53.5 50.4 10.4
netherland 48.6 58.5 51.9 56.9 60.2 57.6 11.6
austria 70.4 82.5 85.6 81.0 85.2 83.6 14.8
Poland 46.0 55.6 57.9 53.9 58.7 58.4 12.7
Portugal 117.7 134.5 138.9 132.0 140.0 139.5 22.3
romania 35.2 44.4 46.8 42.9 47.4 46.9 12.2
Slovenia 66.1 78.2 81.4 76.2 81.3 78.2 15.2
Slovakia 48.0 56.9 59.2 55.4 59.1 57.9 11.1
Finland 59.4 69.6 72.7 68.2 71.6 69.2 12.2
Sweden 35.1 40.3 41.6 39.4 40.9 38.7 5.8
Source: calculated and edited by the author
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shocking, no matter what the course of the 
coronavirus epidemic will be. The absolute 
values of the rise in public debt of these three 
countries give more than 40% of the total debt 
rise in the European union. The financing 
of the drastically rising public debt of these 
countries also gives rise to the probability of 
resorting to orderly default. Hopefully, the 
fiscal and monetary expansion steps of the 
mentioned three member states as well as the 
European union will be sufficient to prevent 
this from happening.
Figure 2
public debT groWTh raTe in The member sTaTes of The eu, as a percenTage  
of gdp (2019-2021)
Source: calculated and edited by the author
1 In 2012, the Greek government reached an 
agreement with private creditors on the general 
terms of debt relief, applicable to all bondholders 
in the private sector. The agreement set out that the 
representatives of the private sector would write off 
53.5% of their claims pertaining to the nominal 
value of Greek sovereign debt instruments (they 
suffer a loss, or depreciation of approx. 53.5%), 
which is a loss larger than that planned, and meant 
more than 70% in terms of the net present value. 
This way a so-called orderly default was applied, 
as the Greek state was not able to repay its debt 
in accordance with the original conditions (Török, 
2018).
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2 The study does not aim to present the economic 
policy measures and state spendings that trigger 
the rise in government debt in detail. For more 
details on this, see (Benczes, Kutasi, 2010; 
Panizzab, Presbiteroc, 2013).
3 other authors, including (czeti, Hoffman, 
2008) also incorporate inflation and other 
factors in their models. It is my view that by 
including the real interest in the model presented 
in the main text, there is no need to add the 
inflation as a separate explanatory variable, as 
the real interest is none other but [(1+nominal 
interest rate) / (1+inflation rate)]–1. Therefore, 
the equation already takes the inflation in the 
real interest rate into consideration. other 
factors may include the privatisation proceeds 
- the weight of these may be so insignificant 
that the study does not examine their role in 
mitigating public debt.
4 If an indebted state pays lower interests for the 
sovereign debt instruments than the change 
of the consumer price level in percentage, this 
allows for the rapid and radical mitigation of 
the public debt, which will also result in the 
decrease of interest costs of government debt. 
This process is called financial repression. In the 
case of financial repression, the government takes 
regulatory measures directing the property of 
savers artificially to the mitigation of the public 
debt, thus market coordination is repressed by 
economic policy (McKinnon R. I., 1990).
5 Probably the outright Monetary Transactions 
(oMT) program launched in the Eu previously 
will not be able to halt the rise of real interest 
rates either. This program allows central banks 
to purchase sovereign debt instruments directly. 
Following the financial crisis, the program was 
able to efficiently contribute to the reduction of 
the bond market yields and thus allowed national 
public finances to improve their financing 
capabilities (Lentner, 2015).
6 In the case of the countries where there were 
no data available in the referenced databases of 
oEcD (Estonia, croatia, cyprus, Malta and 
Romania), the data of national economies with 
similar economic fundamentals were used in the 
calculation.
7 Following the global financial crisis of 2008, 
Ireland’s public debt to GDP increased by 34% 
between 2010-2012, that of spain increased by 
25.8% between 2010-2012, cyprus’ rate increased 
by 23.9% between 2010-2012, Portugal’s 
increased by 25.2% between 2008-2010, while 
Greece’s public debt to GDP increased by 45.4% 
between 2009-2011 (Eurostat, 2020).
8 Greece’s gross public debt to GDP exceeding 
200% was already forecasted by the study of 
Török (2018) as a consequence of a global crisis 
only existing conditionally at the time. The study 
forecasted the Greek public debt rate to reach 
203.2% by the year 2022.
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